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Abstract
Describing individual behavior, we will be concerned with an axiom system, which
can be interpreted by Shephard’s distance function. Based on this function, one can
discover the individual’s preference relation, from which the individual’s demand
function can be derived. We will realize that the axiom system describes rational
behavior, satisfying the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference. The axiom system
presented in this article is closely related to a former one describing consumer be-
havior by income compensation functions. These different approaches will help to
illuminate choice behavior from different points of view. We will also see that the
axiom system presented in this article can be interpreted by the economic quantity
index in welfare theory and by distance functions in producer theory.
JEL classification: D71, C78
Keywords: Economic Models, Demand Functions, Distance Functions, Ratio-
nality, Preferences, Producer Theory, Welfare Theory
1 INTRODUCTION 1
1 Introduction
In this article, we will be concerned with an axiom system, which can be applied to
various fields of economic activities.This axiom system will not only establish a con-
vincing model of consumer behavior, but also an appropriate approach to quantity
indices in welfare theory, and to the role of Shephard’s distance function in producer
theory. If the individual’s behavior satisfies the axioms, then one can recover the indi-
vidual’s preference relation, which possesses all these properties usually assumed in
economic theory. By means of this preference relation, the individual’s demand func-
tion, which is rational with respect to the individual’s preference relation and satisfies
the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference, can be derived.
We shall also add further results to the relationship of the above axiom system with
another one based on income compensation functions, interpreting consumer behav-
ior from another point of view [6].
Going further, it will be shown that the output distance function and the input distance
function of production technologies also fulfill similar properties as required by the ax-
ioms. Therefore, similar structures in consumer and producer theory are generated.
The article proceeds in the following way. Firstly, the axiom system will be presented.
Secondly, we will see that the economic quantity index fulfills the axioms. Thirdly, it
will be shown that a reasonable theory of consumer behavior can be constructed as
an interpretation of the axiom system. Then, we shall confine attention to a further
axiom system concerned with the individual’s compensated demand [6], showing that
we can establish a close relationship between the two axiom systems.
Finally, we will consider the structure of input and output distance functions in pro-
ducer theory which is also similar to the structure of the axiom system initially estab-
lished.
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2 A Model of Rational Behavior
In a previous article, a formal axiom system has been presented, which can be
interpreted as a model of rational individual behavior in economics [6]. It does not
assume that a utility function is given, but a preference relation is deduced from the
individual’s observable behavior.
This model is closely related to theories of demand such as the theory of revealed
preference [14] and integrability theory [15], which start with demand functions
describing consumer’s observable behavior.
For modeling rational behavior, we will consider a set X ⊆ Rn+ of commodity bundles,
and a function D : X × X → R+ describing behavior of an individual who reveals his
or her preferences for commodity bundles compared to others.
By x ∈ Rn+, we mean xi ≥ 0 for all i ≤ n, and by x ∈ Rn++, we mean xi > 0 for all
i ≤ n.
The individual’s behavior is supposed to fulfill the following axioms [8].
(E I) D(x, x) = 1, ∀x ∈ X.
(E II) For any x′, x′′ ∈ X, and any fixed x0 ∈ X,
(i) D(x′, x0) = D(x′′, x0)⇒ ∀x ∈ X : D(x′, x) = D(x′′, x),
(ii) D(x′, x0) > D(x′′, x0)⇒ ∀x ∈ X : D(x′, x) > D(x′′, x).
For any fixed x0 ∈ X :
(E III) D(x, x0) is increasing in x,1)
(E IV) D(x, x0) is continuous in x,
(E V) D(x, x0) is concave in x, if X is convex.
D(x, x0) may be interpreted as the desirability of commodity bundle x relative to x0
which is known through the agent’s observable behavior. (E II) requires that the indi-
vidual’s evaluation is independent of the reference commodity bundle x0. Therefore,
1) D(x, x0) is increasing, if for all x1, x2 ∈ X : x1 > x2 ⇒ D(x1, x0) > D(x2, x0), where x1 > x2 means,
x1i > x
2
i , ∀i ≤ n.
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if the individual appreciates x more than x′ compared to the reference point x0, then
this appriciation must hold compared to any other reference commodity bundle. This
is like measuring temperature by Celsius or Fahrenheit. (E III) to (E V) are regularity
conditions.
In a previous article, it has been shown that Shephard’s distance function d(x, x′) =
max{λ ∈ R++| xλ  x′} [16], where  is the agent’s given relation, satisfies the con-
ditions (E I) to (E V) under appropriate conditions [8, 7]. Therefore, d(x, x′) verifies
the axiom system (E I) to (E V). The distance function can be applied in many ways
in economics, for example, in production theory [1, 16], utility theory [3, 4], or welfare
theory [2, 11].
In the next section, we will recognize that in welfare theory we can also observe a
structure as described by (E I) to (E V).
3 Interpretations of (E I) to (E V) in Welfare Economics
Consider now a household that initially is observed to choose commodity bundle x0
in price situation p. While the prices remain constant, the household is observed to
choose another bundle x1 at a later time. The quantities of goods will not have changed
in the same way. The question arises whether or how much the household’s welfare
has changed. To answer this question, the quantity index
Q(p; x1, x0) =
px1
px0
, p ∈ Rn++, where px =
n
∑
i=1
pixi
can be used [3].
Q(p; x1, x0) measures the increase or loss of welfare of a household when the house-
hold initially consumes commodity bundle x0, and at a later time commodity bundle
x1. In most cases, the components of x0 will not have risen or fallen by the same pro-
portion, but generally, some components will have risen and others will have fallen. In
order to find out the household’s welfare change with the move from x0 to x1, one can
multiply x0 and x1 with prices p0 of the initial situation, where x0 has been chosen, or
with prices p1 of the final situation, where x1 has been chosen.
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The corresponding quantity indices Q(p0; x1, x0) = p
0x1
p0x0 and Q(p
1; x1, x0) = p
1x1
p1x0 are
referred to as Laspeyres quantity index and Paasche quantity index, respectively. Both
indices indicate whether the welfare of the household has risen or fallen. Q(p; x, y)
for any price level p are to be used to compare a large number of different “shopping
baskets” on a consistent basis of prices p ∈ Rn++. It can be easily shown that Q(p; x, y)
satisfies (E I) to (E V), and is therefore a meaningful interpretation of the axiom system
(E I) to (E V) in economics.
Theorem 1 Let X = Rn+, and p ∈ Rn++, then the quantity index Q(p; ., .); X × X ⇒ R,
Q(p; x1, x0) = px
1
px0 satisfies (E I) to (E V) for x
0 ∈ X \ {0}.
The proof follows immediately.
The preceding result also demonstrates that the axioms (E I) to (E V) are consistent.
In the next section, we will consider a consumer who behaves at the market in
accordance with the hypotheses (E I) to (E V). It will be seen that we can develop a
reasonable model of consumer behavior.
4 A Model of Consumer Behavior
As shown in [8], the axioms (E I) to (E V) can also be used to develop a model of
consumer behavior. If the consumer’s observable behavior adheres to the conditions
(E I) to (E V), then his or her preference relation Rd can be deduced and possesses
important properties. Based on Rd, one can construct a model of consumer behavior
according to traditional consumer theory.
It is appropriate to define the preference relation Rd deduced from the consumer’s
behavior, as
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Definition 4.1: For any reference commodity bundle x0,
xRdx′ :⇐⇒ D(x, x0) ≥ D(x′, x0), ∀x, x′ ∈ X.
One can easily see that relation Rd possesses all qualities usually assumed in traditional
consumer theory. This result has been shown in [8] and will be recalled in this article.
Theorem 2 Let X ⊆ Rn+ be a closed cone 2) and assume (E I) to (E IV), then Rd is a complete
3), transitive, monotonic 4) and continuous 5) relation on X. If X is convex, then additionally
assuming (E V), Rd is convex. Moreover, if more strictly
(E V’): D(x, x0) is strictly concave,
holds, then Rd is strictly convex 6).
Based on Theorem 2, one can deduce a demand function describing consumer’s be-
havior.
The individual’s demand correspondence h : Rn++ ×R+ −→ 2X usually is defined as
a mapping assigning to every price-income situation (p, M) and budget set B(p, M) =
{y ∈ X|py ≤ M} that set of alternatives h(p, M) in B(p, M), h(p, M) 6= ∅, which the
individual chooses from B(p, M). By definition, “h is rational” with respect to Rd, if
for all (p, M) ∈ Rn++ × R+, h(p, M) = {x ∈ B(p, M)|∀y ∈ B(p, M) : xRdy}. This
means that the individual’s behavior corresponds to his or her preferences in every
price-income situation. Note that h(p, M) is single-valued, if (E V’) instead of (E V) is
assumed, and then h is called a demand function.
2) X is a cone in Rn+, if x ∈ X ⇒ λx ∈ X, ∀λ ≥ 0.
3) A relation  is complete, if for all x, y ∈ X, x  y ∨ y  x holds.
4) A relation  is monotonic, if for all x1, x2 ∈ X : x1 > x2 ⇒ x1  x2, where  denotes the
asymmetric part of .
5) A relation  on X is upper (lower) semicontinuous, if for all x ∈ X, the set R(x) = {y ∈ X|y 
x}(R−1(x) = {y ∈ X|x  y}) is closed in X. If  is upper and lower semicontinuous on X, then 
is continuous on X.
6)  on the convex set X ⊆ Rn+ is strictly convex, if for all x, y ∈ X, and (x 6= y), x  y implies
λx + (1− λ)y  y, ∀λ ∈ (0, 1).
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In view of Theorem 2, the following Theorem 3 can be proven according to Proposition
2.1 in [9].
Theorem 3 Let X = Rn+, and assume (E I), (E II), (E III), (E IV) and (E V’), then there exists
a demand function h : Rn++ ×R+ → Rn+ such that
(a) h is rational with respect to Rd,
(b) h is homogeneous of degree 0 in (p, M), i.e. h(λp,λM) = h(p, M), ∀λ > 0,
(c) h is continuous in p,
(d) ∀(p, M) ∈ Rn++ ×R+ : ph(p, M) = M.
Remark: If we, more weakly, assume (E V) instead of (E V’), then according to Theo-
rem 1, Rd is convex and, therefore, h(p, M) can be many-valued. It can then be demon-
strated that h(p, M) is upper hemicontinuous at every p ∈ Rn++. (For a proof, see [9,
Proposition 3.2] ).
The previous analysis has shown the surprising result that from the axioms (E I) to (E
V’) a demand function can be derived describing consumer’s behavior in accordance
with traditional classical demand theory, where the agent’s preference relation is given.
We will also realize that the demand function derived in our model satisfies the Strong
Axiom of Revealed Preference [10] being an important law in the theory of demand.
5 A Relationship to the Theory of Revealed Preference
The Theory of Revealed Preference has been pioneered by P. Samuelson [14]. It is
a model of consumer behavior constructed by assuming the existence of a demand
function describing individual’s behavior which is in principle observable. An
important hypothesis of this theory is the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference [14]
which we recall now.
Based on the given demand function h : Rn++ × R+ → Rn+, the relation “revealed
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preferred”, denoted by R, will be formulated in the following way [13, 14]: For x 6= y,
define R as
xRy :⇔ ∃(p, M) ∈ Rn++ ×R+, x = h(p, M) ∧ y ∈ B(p, M).
By interpretation, xRy means that x is chosen in the price-income situation (p, M)
where also y is available. The individual has shown by his or her behavior that he
or she likes x more than y.
The Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference requires rational behavior of the agent. It will
be stated here in the following version [13] :
For x 6= y : xRy⇒ ¬(yRx), ∀x, y in the range of h where ¬means not.
Furthermore, we recall the relation “indirectly revealed preferred”, R∗, which denotes
the transitive hull of R. For x 6= y, define R∗ as
xR∗y :⇔ xRy ∨ ∃x1, ..., xk : xRx1 ∧ x1Rx2 ∧ ...∧ xkRy.
By interpretation, xR∗y means if x and y cannot be compared directly with each other
in a price-income situation, then there exists a sequence of price-income situations and
commodity bundles chosen in these situations which are revealed preferred to each
other.
In order to accomplish Samuelson’s revealed preference theory, Houthakker intro-
duced the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference [10].
The Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference can be formulated as [10, 13] :
For x 6= y : xR∗y⇒ ¬(yR∗x), ∀x, y in the range of h.
Theorem 4 Let the hypotheses (E I) to (E IV) and (E V’) hold. Then the demand function
hd : Rn++×R+ → Rn+ being rational with respect to Rd satisfies the Strong Axiom of Revealed
Preference.
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Proof. Consider x, y ∈ Rn+, x 6= y. In contrary, let us suppose that xR∗y and yR∗x hold.
From xR∗y, we obtain xRy∨ ∃x1, ..., xk : xRx1 ∧ ...∧ xkRy. If xRy, then by the definition
of R, ∃(p, M) : x ∈ hd(p, M) ∧ y ∈ B(p, M). Since hd is single-valued and rational with
respect to Rd, we obtain xPdy.
If xR∗y and ¬xRy, then by the same argumentation as previously, we obtain, xPdx1 ∧
...∧ xkPdy. In this case, transitivity and completeness of Rd imply xPdy.
From yR∗x, we obtain yPdx analogously. Therefore, we have xPdy ∧ yPdx. From this,
xPdx follows, a contradiction to the irreflexivity of Pd.
The preceding analysis has shown that the demand function hd, deduced from the
axioms (E I) to (E IV) and (E V’), which is rational with respect to Rd, is also rational in
the sense of the Theory of Revealed Preference, because it satisfies the Strong Axiom
of Revealed Preference.
6 A Relationship to Compensated Consumer Theory
In a former article [6], another model has been developed that is closely related to the
axiom system (E I) to (E V). In the present article, we will point out further results.
Therefore, consider a closed set X ⊆ Rn+, X 6= ∅ of commodity bundles and a
mapping M(p, x) of Rn++ × X into R+, where p ∈ Rn++ denotes price vectors and x
commodity bundles. M(p, x) is supposed to satisfy the following axioms [6]:
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(C I) ∀x ∈ X : [(∀p ∈ Rn++ : px ≥ M(p, x)].
(C II) ∀x, y ∈ X : [(x 6= y ∧ ∀p ∈ Rn++ : px ≥ M(p, y))⇒ ∃p′ ∈ Rn++ :
p′y ≤ M(p′, x)].
(C III)(i) ∀x, y ∈ X : [∃p0 ∈ Rn++ : M(p0, x) = M(p0, y)⇒ ∀p ∈ Rn++ :
M(p, x) = M(p, y)].
(C III)(ii) ∀x, y ∈ X : [∃p0 ∈ Rn++ : M(p0, x) > M(p0, y)⇒ ∀p ∈ Rn++ :
M(p, x) > M(p, y)].
(C IV) ∀p ∈ Rn++, ∀x ∈ X : [∃z ∈ X : zRx and pz = M(p, x)].
(C V) M(p0, x) is continuous in x.
(C VI) If X is convex, then M(p0, x) is strictly quasiconcave.
M(p, x) has been interpreted as the income compensation function of an agent [6]. As
verification, it has been shown that the well-known McKenzie income compensation
function m(p, x) = min
y∈X
{py|y  x} [12], depending on the properties of a given
preference relation , satisfies the axioms (C I) to (C VI) [8]. Furthermore, it has been
shown that, based on the axioms (E I) to (E IV), the McKenzie income compensation
function m0(p, x) = min
y∈X
{py|yRdx} also satisfies the axioms (C I), (C III), (C IV), and
(C V).
In order to demonstrate that (C II) also holds, we have to add a further condition
which establishes a bridge from the axiom system (E I)-(E IV) to (C I)-(C V). This
bridge is formed by assuming the following condition.
Property (α)
For all x ∈ X, there exists a p ∈ Rn++ such that px = miny∈X{py|D(y, x
0) ≥ D(x, x0)} for
any x0 ∈ X.
Since X ⊆ Rn+ is assumed to be closed, and since by (E IV), D(z, x0) is continuous in z,
min
y∈X
{py|D(y, x0 ≥ D(x, x0)} is well-defined. Therefore, in view of the definition of Rd,
instead of (α) we can write
Property (α′) For all x ∈ X, there exists a p ∈ Rn++ such that px = miny∈X{py|yRdx}.
Property (α′) means that for every x there exists a price situation p, where x is the
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cheapest commodity bundle which is at least as good as x itself. Applying Property
(α′), we can prove the following theorem. Preliminarily, I will recall a result published
in [7, Theorem 1, p.1228].
Lemma 1 If  is a complete, transitive, continuous and locally nonsatiated 7) relation on a
closed cone X ⊆ Rn+, then m(p0, x) is a continuous representation of  for any p0 ∈ Rn++,
and therefore, m(p0, x1) ≥ m(p0, x2)⇔ x1  x2.
Theorem 5 Let X ⊆ Rn+ be a closed cone and let (E I) to (E IV) hold, then
(a) m0(p0, x), for any p0 ∈ Rn++, satisfies (C I), (C III), (C IV) and (C V).
(b) If, additionally, X is convex and (E V’) holds, then (C VI) is fulfilled.
(c) If, additionally, ( α′ ) is assumed, then (C II) is fulfilled.
Proof. According to Theorem 16 in [8], the validity of (C I), (C II), (C IV), and (C V) can
be proven. Therefore, (a) is fulfilled. It remains to show (C II) and (C VI).
Proof for (b). According to Theorem 2, we already know that Rd is strictly convex if (E
V’) instead of (E V) is assumed. Moreover, Theorem 2 and Lemma 2 yield that Rd is
representable by m0(p0, x). Therefore, it follows that m0(p0, x) is strictly quasiconcave,
and thus (C VI) is fulfilled.
Proof for c). Consider any x, y ∈ X, x 6= y, and assume
(1) ∀p ∈ Rn++ : px ≥ m0(p, y).
By contradiction, suppose, ∀p′ ∈ Rn++ : p′y > m0(p′, x). In view of Property (α′),
there exists p0 ∈ Rn++ such that p0y = m0(p0, y), and hence m0(p0, y) > m0(p0, x).
Since according to Theorem 2, Rd is a complete, transitive, continuous and monotonic
relation on the closed cone X, it is also locally nonsatiated. Therefore, we can apply the
above Lemma 1 and obtain yPdx. From (1) and Property (α′), it also follows that there
exists p˜ ∈ Rn++, such that p˜x = m0( p˜, x) and m0( p˜, x) ≥ m0( p˜, y), and hence in view
of the above lemma xRdy. However, this is a contradiction to yPdx, and therefore (C II)
7) A relation  on a set X is locally nonsatiated, if for every x ∈ X and every e > 0, there exists
y ∈ Ne(x) ∩ X such that y  x, where Ne(x) is the e-neigborhood of x.
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holds.
We thus have seen that if the income compensation function fulfills the axioms (E I) to
(E V’) and (α′), it also fulfills (C I) to (C VI). It depends on the information which of
these axiom systems should be applied to a real problem.
7 Structures in Producer Theory
Now, we will turn to producer theory, showing that we can discover similar mathe-
matical structures underlying the economic model as in consumer theory. We will see
that slight modifications of the axioms system (E II) to (E V) will be appropriate for
modelling producer behavior. In producer theory, one studies the production plans of
a firm. By P(x), we will denote the production possibility set of an input vector x ∈ Rn+
producing the output y ∈ P(x) ⊆ Rm+. P(x) is usually assumed to be a convex subset
ofRm+. In producer theory, distance functions are also an important tool to describe the
technology of a production process (see [1, 4], for instance). One example is the output
distance function, defined as:
Definition 7.1: The function D0 : X × Y → R+, where X ⊆ Rn+ and Y ⊆ Rm+,
D0(x, y) = inf{λ > 0| yλ ∈ P(x)},
is called the ”output distance function”, where λ is the smallest scalar by which we
have to divide the output y and are still able to produce an output consistent with a
given technology and a given input quantity described by the input vector x.
We will now characterize the output distance function of a technology by properties
similar to the properties required by the axioms (E II) to (E V). Remember that x always
denotes input and y denotes output.
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(Po I) For any x′, x′′ ∈ X and any y0 ∈ Y,
(i) : Do(x′, y0) = Do(x′′, y0)⇒ ∀y ∈ Y : Do(x′, y) = Do(x′′, y),
(ii) : Do(x′, y0) > Do(x′′, y0)⇒ ∀y ∈ Y : Do(x′, y) > Do(x′′, y).
(Po II) Do(x, y0) is decreasing on X for y0 ∈ Y, i.e.
x′ > x′′ ⇒ Do(x′, y0) < Do(x′′, y0), ∀x′, x′′ ∈ X.
(Po III) Do(x0, y) is increasing on Y for x0 ∈ X, i.e.
y′ > y′′ ⇒ Do(x0, y′) > Do(x0, y′′), ∀y′, y ∈ Y.
(Po IV) Do(x0, y) is convex on Y for x0 ∈ X, if Y is a convex set.
Moreover, it is also convenient sometimes to require that Do is homogeneous of degree
1 in y, i.e.:
(Po V) For any x0 ∈ X : Do(x0, ty) = tDo(x0, y), ∀t > 0.
Another characterization of output distance functions can be found in Fa¨re [5, p. 30].
Note, since by (Po IV), Do(x0, y) is convex on Y, then it is also continuous, if Y is convex
and open.
We will now verify the axiom system (Po I) to (Po V) showing that the Cobb-Douglas
technology with the production function y = xα1 x
1−α
2 for α ∈ [0, 1], y ∈ R++, and
(x1, x2) ∈ R2++ satisfies these axioms.
Theorem 6 The output distance function DCo (x, y) = inf{λ > 0| yλ ≤ xα1 x1−α2 , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1}
of the Cobb-Douglas production technology satisfies (Po I) to (Po V).
Proof. For (Po I) (i): Given x′, x′′ ∈ R2++, and any y0 ∈ R++. Assume λ′ = inf{λ >
0| y0λ ≤ (x′1)α(x′2)1−α} = λ′′ = Do(x′′, y0).
Hence, λ′ = y
0
(x′1)α(x′2)1−α
= λ′′ = y
0
(x′′1 )α(x′′2 )1−α
, and thus, in view of λ′ = λ′′, for all
y ∈ R++ : y(x′1)α(x′2)1−α =
y
(x′′1 )α(x′′2 )1−α
.
This immediately implies, DCo (x′, y) = DCo (x′′, y) for x′, x′′ > 0.
For (Po I ii): the proof follows analogously.
Accordingly, the proofs for (Po III) to (Po V) also immediately follow.
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By the above proof, we also have shown that the axiom system (Po I) to (Po V) is con-
sistent.
Finally, we shall turn to the input distance function, having a similar structure as re-
quired by the axioms (E II) to (E V).
Definition 7.2: The function Di : Y × X → R+, where Y ⊆ Rm+ and X ⊆ Rn+,
Di(y, x) = sup{δ > 0| xδ ∈ L(y)},
where x ∈ L(y) ⇐⇒ y ∈ P(x), is called the ”input distance” function.
For any given output y, Di(y, x) points out the fraction of input x which can still pro-
duce y. In analogy to the previous axiom system, we will now consider producer be-
havior based on the following postulates concerning the input distance function.
(Pi I) For any y′, y′′ ∈ Y, and any x0 ∈ X,
(i) Di(y′, x0) = Di(y′′, x0)⇒ ∀x ∈ X : Di(y′, x) = Di(y′′, x),
(ii) Di(y′, x0) > Di(y′′, x0)⇒ ∀x ∈ X : Di(y′, x) > Di(y′′, x).
(Pi II) Di(y0, x) is increasing on X for y0 ∈ Y.
(Pi III) Di(y, x0) is decreasing on Y for x0 ∈ X.
(Pi IV) Di(y0, x) is concave on X for y0 ∈ Y, if X is a convex set.
Moreover, it is often assumed that Di is homogeneous of degree 1 in x, i.e.,
(Pi V) Di(y0, tx) = tDi(y0, x), ∀t > 0 and y0 ∈ Y.
We will now consider an example of an input distance function describing a technology
of a plant producing two outputs with two inputs.
The input distance function is assumed to be
Dpi (y, x) =
√
x1x2√
y21+y
2
2
, for x ∈ R2++, y ∈ R2++.
Then we can see that the axioms (Pi I) to (Pi V) are satisfied.
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8 Conclusion
In the preceding analysis, we have investigated the similarity of the underlying struc-
tures of different economic models. The axioms forming the frame of these models
can meaningfully describe economic activities and techniques. We have studied axiom
systems which can be interpreted reasonably by index numbers in welfare theory, and
in consumer and producer theory. Pointing out the similarities facilitates the analysis
of economic behavior.
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